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Autopsie · Society

The Blood Debt: The Elites and the State, from Complicity to Redemption

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First published in Le Nouvelliste on 2 April 2026. Read on lenouvelliste.com ↗

Translated from the French original. In case of discrepancy, the French text prevails. Read the French original

At the top of Haiti’s social pyramid, the Titanic illusion persists: the belief that one can survive in first class while the hull is torn open. This column puts a price on that illusion and proposes a war tax, paid jointly by the private sector and the public authorities.

A manifesto for a “War Tax” and a Sacred Union: why the private sector and the public authorities must pay the bill for the reconquest together, or perish separately.

THE END OF THE “TITANIC” MYTH

There is a stubborn illusion at the top of Haiti’s social pyramid, a fantasy that has long lulled Pétion-Ville, Kenscoff, and the unreachable heights to sleep at night. It is the “Titanic” illusion: the arrogant belief that one can survive indefinitely, champagne in hand, in the first-class cabins, even as the ship’s hull has been ripped open in third class and the water is rising.

That illusion is dead. Recent events have proved it to us with the brutality of an object lesson. Violence no longer has geographic borders. It no longer needs a “pass” to climb up to the heights. When Bel-Air, Solino, or downtown go up in flames, the smoke blackens the walls of the most heavily fortified villas, and the entire economy suffocates.

Today, as the security forces, in a burst of dignity, storm the criminal strongholds in an attempt to save what is left of the Republic, an uncomfortable but unavoidable question arises: Where are the elites? And by “elites,” I mean not only the captains of industry, but also the predatory political class that has run the state.

We must have the courage to say it bluntly: if this country is fractured, it is because it has been methodically broken. Broken by an economic elite that has too often practiced silent secession, refusing to invest in the common good. Broken by public authorities who turned the state into a personal feeding trough, leaving the gangs to fill the void where the state’s sovereign functions should have been.

But this is no longer the time for a moral trial, because the courthouse is on fire. This is the time for the arithmetic of survival. Reconquest operations are expensive. Social reconstruction (“the Build”) is more expensive still. The state, bled dry and looted, cannot carry this burden alone.

This text is a call for general mobilization. It explains why and how the economic elites and the public authorities must move from being passive culprits to being shareholders in security.

AUTOPSY OF A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

Before asking the elites to pay, we must remind them why they owe a debt. Haiti’s fracture is not an accident of nature; it is a human construction.

1. The Secession of the Economic Elites

For decades, part of Haiti’s private sector lived in a bubble of fiscal and social impunity. The model was simple: massive imports, monopoly rent, and total disinvestment from the surrounding social fabric.

Ever higher walls were built to keep poverty out, instead of schools to reduce it. Worse, out of cynical pragmatism, some segments of the private sector thought they could “buy peace” by financing gang leaders to secure their convoys or their warehouses.

It was a Faustian pact. By feeding the crocodile so that it would eat the others, we ended up making it big enough to devour us. Today, the gangs no longer ask for alms; they demand everything. The economic elite is to blame for believing that it could prosper in an ocean of distress without ever getting its feet wet.

2. The Betrayal of the Public Authorities

But make no mistake: if the economic elite sinned through selfishness, the political elite sinned through predation. The public authorities bear the overwhelming responsibility of having abdicated.

It was senators, ministers, and agency heads who, for twenty years, used the gangs as tools for managing elections. It was the state’s customs service that let in the containers of weapons and ammunition that are killing our police officers today.

The state was not “overwhelmed” by the gangs; in many respects, it incubated them. To ask the private sector to contribute today without demanding a mea culpa and drastic reform from the public authorities would be a swindle.

We are therefore facing a “double bankruptcy.” To get out of it, we need a “double mobilization.”

THE COLOMBIAN MODEL: WHEN ELITES PAY TO SURVIVE

The Haitian state is technically bankrupt. It cannot finance a high-intensity war and a social reconstruction (a “Marshall Plan”) with its current revenue. It needs fresh money, right now.

The business community’s classic argument is familiar and understandable: “I already pay for my private security, my generators, my water, my roads. The state gives me nothing; it robs me through customs. Why should I give one cent more?”

It is valid reasoning in peacetime. It is suicidal reasoning in wartime.

Colombia in 2002: On the Brink of the Abyss

To understand what is possible, let us look at Álvaro Uribe’s Colombia. When he took office in 2002, the country was on its knees. In the early 2000s, some estimates held that a very large share of the territory lay beyond the state’s authority: up to about 40%, according to observers cited by the US Congressional Research Service. The country recorded some 28,000 to 29,000 homicides a year, nearly 80 deaths a day. With nearly 3,000 kidnappings a year, Colombia was the kidnapping capital of the world. The armed forces were demoralized and under-equipped; the state could no longer afford to pay military salaries properly or to buy equipment. The economic elites were moving their capital en masse to Miami and Panama.

Faced with this situation, Uribe made a bold bet: asking the rich to finance their own survival.

The Democratic Security Tax (2002–2006)

In August 2002, the Colombian state introduced an exceptional tax to finance the security effort, at a rate of 1.2% of taxable net worth held on 31 August 2002, for the taxpayers subject to it. The measure had its legal basis in Decree 1838 of 2002 and was explicitly earmarked for preserving democratic security. Initially intended to last for a limited period, the tax was extended and generated substantial resources for the state (El Tiempo, for example, reported that 2.41 trillion pesos had already been collected in 2004).

These exceptional funds allowed the Colombian state to pay for equipment for the armed forces and the police, extend its network of secured posts across the country, and strengthen its intelligence and judicial capacities. The effort was massive and sustained over several years.

Results in Numbers: The Colombian Turnaround

In 4 years (2002–2006), the results were spectacular. The table below shows how the main security indicators changed:

Indicator 2002 2006 Change
Homicides (per year) ~28–29k ~16–18k -40%
Total kidnappings 2,986 687 -77%
Kidnappings for ransom 1,676 282 -83%
Terrorist attacks 1,645 663 -60%

Sources: Ministerio de Defensa Nacional de Colombia, National Police, various converging secondary sources

The Colombian elites’ rational calculation. The Colombian elites agreed to contribute because they understood a simple truth: a fortune of $100 million in a country at civil war is worth nothing, because it can neither generate income nor be moved safely. By contrast, a fortune of $98 or $99 million (after tax) in a secure country is worth everything, because it becomes productive again. Foreign direct investment rose sharply after 2004–2005, economic confidence returned, and the elites got back a state capable of protecting their businesses.

That is the lesson: the Colombian elites did not pay out of altruism. They paid because it was their only chance of economic survival.

The Lessons for Haiti

The Colombian model teaches us three inescapable truths. First truth: without massive, immediate funding, no reconquest is possible. The armored vehicles entering Bel-Air today need ammunition, fuel, and bonuses for the men risking their lives. The Haitian state cannot pay for all that alone. Second truth: distrust of the state is legitimate. That is why the money must be managed by an independent fund in which contributors hold a veto, exactly as in Colombia, where private-sector representatives took part in governing the resources. Third truth: the calculation is rational. If Haiti’s private sector agrees to contribute to financing the reconquest, it gets back a country where factories, banks, and shops can operate without extortion.

THE HAITIAN PROPOSAL: THE “DEFENSE AND RECONSTRUCTION FUND”

Drawing on the Colombian model, here is the concrete structure I propose for Haiti.

1. Contribution Mechanism

An exceptional contribution of 1% to 1.5% of net assets for companies with annual turnover above 50 million gourdes and for individual fortunes above $10 million. Duration: 3 years (renewable depending on results). Collection target: $150 million to $200 million a year.

2. Governance of the Fund

Tripartite management committee: 5 private-sector representatives (elected by the contributors), 3 representatives of the state (the Ministries of the Interior, Defense, and Finance), and 2 international observers (UN, World Bank, or a civil society organization). Decision rules: any expenditure above $1 million requires the approval of 6 of the 10 members (including at least 3 private-sector representatives). Mandatory quarterly audits published online.

3. Allocation of the Funds

60% for tactical equipment for the Haitian National Police (PNH) and the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH), namely armored vehicles, drones, bulletproof vests, and hazard pay paid directly to officers on the front line; 30% for labor-intensive (HIMO) programs in the reconquered areas (wages for young people rebuilding infrastructure: roads, schools, health centers); and 10% for justice and intelligence (witness protection, training for judges, financial intelligence units).

This is not charity. It is a life insurance premium. The elites who contribute today will get back a country where their businesses can operate without extortion.

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT: WHEN THE PRIVATE SECTOR CAN DO WHAT THE STATE NO LONGER CAN

Money is necessary, but not sufficient. Haiti’s elite has a resource the state has lost: logistical competence. The public authorities are sclerotic, slow, and bureaucratic. The large private groups (agribusiness, retail, construction) know how to manage complex supply chains in real time.

1. The Crisis Logistics Partnership

When the PNH retakes Bel-Air or Solino, water, food, and cement must be brought in immediately. The state does not know how to do this quickly. The private sector does. Companies must put their truck fleets, their warehouses and, above all, their logistics managers at the service of the reconstruction effort. Imagine a “Task Force” in which logistics experts from the big retail chains organize the resupply of stricken neighborhoods under police escort. It would be a demonstration of power and efficiency that the gangs could not match.

2. Intelligence from the Private Sector

This is a taboo subject. The private sector is the first victim of extortion, but it is also the most precise source of information. Business owners know who collects the levy, where, at what time, and through which channels. The omertà must be broken. There must be a confidential liaison cell through which the private sector can provide financial intelligence to the police without fear of reprisals. To stop paying the gangs for “protection” and fund the police instead is an immense risk, admittedly. But to go on financing one’s own executioner in the hope of being eaten last is certain death.

THE “SOCIAL SHIELD”: CREATING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES

We have talked about money and logistics. Let us now talk about the economic fracture. If we retake Bel-Air militarily, what will we do with the 20-year-old men who live there? If the formal economy offers them no prospects, the gang will remain their only option.

The “Economic Opportunity Zones” Initiative

The elites’ support must take the form of a Productive Investment Shock in the reconquered areas. Subcontracting workshops must be set up on the edges of working-class neighborhoods (garment making, electronics assembly, food processing); call centers and digital services must be developed (Haiti has a French- and Creole-speaking workforce that can serve North American and Caribbean markets); and accelerated vocational training programs must be financed jointly by the private sector and international donors (3 to 6 months to train welders, electricians, mechanics).

This is not CSR window dressing for an annual report. It is counterinsurgency strategy. A young man with a paycheck no longer plants bombs. He defends his job.

THE DUTY OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITIES: AN END TO PREDATION

This manifesto would be incomplete and unfair if it addressed only the private sector. The state cannot simply hold out its hand to cash the elites’ check. It must reform, or disappear. For the private sector to agree to pay this “War Tax” and to commit itself, the Public Authorities must give immediate, painful proof that they have changed their operating system.

An End to Impunity at Customs. This is the ultimate scandal. Police officers cannot be asked to die at the front if customs officers keep letting in, for bribes, the ammunition that will kill them. The state must place the ports under militarized, transparent security control. Every bullet that comes in is a betrayal by the state of its own troops.

Justice or Chaos. The reconquest operations will produce prisoners. If the criminal justice chain (judges, prosecutors) keeps releasing gang leaders for payment, this whole effort will be in vain. The judicial elite, too, must choose its side. There must be specialized, secure courts and “faceless” judges (protected and anonymous) to handle cases of urban terrorism, as Italy did against the Mafia.

An Exemplary Lifestyle at the Top. Entrepreneurs cannot be asked for an exceptional effort if ministers and agency heads keep living in luxury and squandering what meager resources there are. The state’s austerity must mirror the war effort asked of the nation.

SACRED UNION OR COLLECTIVE SUICIDE

Haiti is at a crossroads. The “status quo” option no longer exists. The option of massive capital flight is an illusion (factories and land do not fit in a suitcase). The fracture between the elite and the people, between the private and the public, is the breach through which the gangs have poured. To close that breach, cement is not enough; it takes a new social contract.

On one side, an economic elite that finally agrees to pay the price of its security and to invest in the productive economy of working-class areas. On the other, a public power that stops being a predator and becomes a protector once more.

Captains of industry, political leaders: History is watching you.

The armored vehicles entering Bel-Air offer you a window of opportunity, perhaps the last. Do not waste it out of greed or cynicism. Turn this military reconquest into a national re-founding.

If you refuse to pay the bill for peace today, rest assured that tomorrow you will pay the price of total collapse. And that price is not negotiable.

L’Anatomie de la Fracture

A book in preparation. An occasional letter to follow its progress and be told when it comes out.

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