After the Armored Vehicles, a Vacuum? The Mistake Haiti Must Avoid in Bel-Air
Translated from the French original. In case of discrepancy, the French text prevails. Read the French original
Port-au-Prince is holding its breath: the sound of gunfire has changed its tone. This piece warns against the Mexican syndrome, the atomization of armed groups after decapitation, which is more dangerous than their concentration if the state does not build the peace.
Port-au-Prince is holding its breath. The crackle of automatic weapons, now the macabre soundtrack of our daily lives, has changed its tone. It is no longer only the sound of criminal aggression; it is the sound of the state striking back. Armored vehicles are climbing to storm Bel-Air. Official statements speak of reconquest, of liberated territories, of order returning.
Yet for the analyst who refuses to give in to the emotion of the moment, the picture is infinitely more complex. This offensive on Bel-Air is an absolute necessity, a life-or-death emergency for the physical survival of the Republic. But urban warfare is not won by superior firepower alone.
If the Haitian state thinks it is enough to “cut off the heads” and plant a flag on the ruins of Bel-Air to claim victory, it is setting itself up for a terrifying aftermath. Latin America’s recent history is a graveyard of military “victories” that turned into social nightmares.
It is imperative to set out the real terms of the equation: the tactical necessity of seizing the Bel-Air linchpin, and the strategic obligation to build (“The Build”) immediately afterward.
THE TACTICAL NECESSITY: WHY BEL-AIR IS THE LINCHPIN
The operation under way must first be validated. Why Bel-Air? To understand, we must stop looking at the city through a civilian’s eyes and adopt the gaze of a military strategist.
1. The Tyranny of the Heights (“The High Ground”) This is the golden rule of polemology: whoever holds the heights controls what lies below. Bel-Air is not an outlying neighborhood; it is a strategic promontory jutting into the heart of the capital. From its rooftops and terraces, one has both line of sight and line of fire over the nerve centers of the state: the Champ de Mars, the National Palace, the ministries. As long as the criminal coalition held Bel-Air, it imposed an access-denial zone over the seat of government. It forced the administration into exodus. Retaking Bel-Air means recovering the city’s control tower. It is the sine qua non for the state ever to return physically to the city center.
2. Breaking the Criminal Corridor Bel-Air is the Gordian knot of gang logistics. The goal of the coalition Viv Ansanm (“living together” in Creole) is territorial continuity: to create an unbroken axis running from Cité Soleil in the north to Grand-Ravine in the south. Bel-Air is the central hinge of this setup. It is the transit point for weapons and men. Taking Bel-Air means driving a steel wedge into this corridor, cutting off the warlords of the waterfront from their allies to the east, and breaking the fluidity of their movements.
The military operation is therefore justified. It is even overdue. But this is where the military solution ends and the political trap begins.
THE SPECTER OF MEXICO: THE HYDRA EFFECT AND ATOMIZATION
Suppose the operation is a complete tactical success. Suppose the gang leaders are neutralized. What happens next? If the strategy is limited to the kinetic component (“kill or capture”), we are heading straight for disaster. We must look squarely at the figures of Mexico’s federal failure.
The Lesson of Fragmentation (2006–2016) In 2006, the Mexican government launched its all-out war on the narcos. At the time, organized crime was structured around four (4) major cartels, each of them hegemonic. The target was clear, the hierarchy vertical. The state adopted the Kingpin strategy (taking out the leaders). The result? Ten years later, the 4 major cartels had splintered. In 2020, intelligence reports counted nearly 200 criminal organizations: cells, gangs, and militias.
Why is fragmentation worse than concentration? The state believed that destroying the large structures would be enough. But it created the “Lernaean Hydra” effect.
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Chaotic Hyperviolence: A big gang boss can impose discipline. Two hundred small competing warlords cannot. Anarchy replaces the mafia order.
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Predation on the Population: This is the mortal danger for Haiti. The big Mexican cartels lived off drug exports. The micro-cartels born of the breakup, too weak for the international market, fell back on the local economy. They began kidnapping doctors, extorting street vendors, stealing fuel. Violence was democratized.
If we break Viv Ansanm in Bel-Air without filling the vacuum, we will have 50 hungry micro-gangs terrorizing every alley to survive.
THE “BUILD” DOCTRINE: SOCIAL URBANISM AS A WEAPON OF WAR
How can this scenario be avoided? The answer again comes from Latin America, but this time from its successes. For while Mexico failed at the federal level, some states such as Yucatán and Nuevo León, as well as the city of Medellín in Colombia, succeeded. The common doctrine is clear: you do not pacify through destruction; you pacify through substitution and dignity.
A “Clear, Hold, and Build” strategy must be applied, with overwhelming emphasis on the “Build.” Here is what the state must do, in concrete terms, in Bel-Air:
1. The Architecture of Dignity (The Medellín Model) In Medellín, Sergio Fajardo developed the theory of Social Urbanism around a key phrase: “The most beautiful for the most humble.” The state did not merely repair sidewalks. It built monumental Library Parks (Parques Biblioteca), designed by the best architects, in the middle of the most dangerous slums. Why? For the psychological shock. When the state puts up a building of excellence in Bel-Air, it sends a message: “You are citizens worthy of dignity, not residents of a red zone.” That steals the population’s loyalty away from the gangs. In Bel-Air, the ruins of the police stations must be turned into first-rate community centers, air-conditioned, connected, and open to young people.
2. Ending Physical Isolation (The Nuevo León Model) In the Mexican state of Nuevo León (Monterrey), the authorities understood that gangs thrived on urban isolation. They launched massive programs to cut through neighborhoods, create access routes, and connect the periphery to the economic center. For Bel-Air, this means breaking up the maze of closed “lakous” with well-lit access roads. An open neighborhood is one where the police patrol, where ambulances can get in, and where the gang can no longer set up ambushes. Light (stand-alone solar street lighting) is a security weapon as powerful as an armored vehicle.
3. Rebuilding the Social Fabric (The Yucatán Example) Yucatán is Mexico’s safest state, often compared to Europe in terms of security. Their secret? Community policing and massive investment in civic associations. Instead of sending only shock troops, they funded sports clubs, mothers’ associations, neighborhood soccer leagues. They filled young people’s free time. In Bel-Air, once the shooting stops, the state must flood the neighborhood with social workers, sports coaches, and mediators, not just police officers.
4. The Economic Weapon: HIMO as Counterinsurgency This is where economics meets security. Gangsterism in Haiti is above all a labor market for young people with no prospects. To dry up recruitment into the micro-gangs of tomorrow, massive labor-intensive (HIMO) programs must be launched. As soon as the shooting stops, thousands of jobs must be created so that the neighborhood can be rebuilt by its own residents. The young people of Bel-Air must be paid in cash, immediately and decently, to rebuild what they were sometimes forced to destroy. It is a cold calculation: it is cheaper for the Public Treasury to pay a day laborer’s wage to 5,000 young people than to finance an urban war against them for ten years. It is buying social peace.
CONCLUSION
Bel-Air is a test of credibility for the nation. The military operation is the key that opens the door, but it is not the house.
If we leave Bel-Air devastated after the assault, if we think the gangs’ flight is an end in itself, we will commit Mexico’s federal error: the Hydra will grow back, more vicious than before. The Haitian state must draw inspiration from the local successes of Medellín and Monterrey. It must prove that it is not merely a force of repression but a force of construction. Cement, jobs, the library, and light are the only munitions that never run out and that guarantee a definitive victory.
In Bel-Air, the point is not to win the war only to lose the peace. It is to refound the Republic, square meter by square meter.